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BOOK REVIEW
Social identity and its discontents
Amartya Sen, Identity and violence: The illusion of destiny, Norton, New York (2006) ISBN 0-393-
06007-1 (cloth), xx+215 pp., $24.95.
Kwame Anthony Appiah, The ethics of identity, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ (2005) 
ISBN  0-691-12036-6 (cloth), xvii+358 pp., $32.95. 
Tom Postmes and Jolanda Jetten, Editors, Individuality and the group: Advances in social iden-
tity, Sage, London (2006) ISBN 1-4129-0321-3 (paper), 286 pp., $44.95.
In 1944, a Muslim day laborer named Kader Mia was knifed while looking for work in Dhaka, Bengal, in what later 
became the geographically separated eastern part of Pakistan, and still later Bangladesh. His assailants were un-
known to him except that they were Hindus for whom his Muslim identity was suffi cient reason to kill him. Bleeding 
profusely, he stumbled through a gate into a garden where he asked an eleven-year-old boy for help and water. The 
boy called his parents and got some water, but Kader Mia later died in the hospital.
The boy who couldn’t save him was Amartya Sen, who grew up to win the Nobel Prize in economics. In Identity 
and violence Sen draws on his broad knowledge of the social sciences and humanities to address, in lucid and read-
able prose, the nature of identity and its relation to violence. Violence, in his view, is the result of dichotomization, in 
which people divide into two fundamental groups, failing to recognize the multidimensionality of identity. To recog-
nize that individual identities are multidimensional—we all belong to multiple groups—is to recognize, in turn, the 
necessity of reason and choice in matters of identity.
Similarly, in The ethics of identity, the renowned philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah, also an elegant writer, ob-
serves that we are not simply members of groups or products of culture. Individuality and autonomy, he argues, are 
fundamental to personhood in all social and cultural contexts. Group affi liations are not only consistent with the lib-
eral individualism of John Stuart Mill but in fact complement it.
By identity both Sen and Appiah mean something like what social psychologists call social identity. Your iden-
tity is constituted by the groups with which you identify. But we identify with multiple groups and thus cannot be re-
duced to membership in a single category. This mandates reason and choice, and thus a rational agent to engage in 
reasoning and make choices. The autonomous individual simply cannot be eliminated, either from our cultures or 
from our theories.
Among social psychologists, meanwhile, there are concerns about social identity that correspond precisely with 
those of Sen and Appiah. In Individuality and the group, editors Tom Postmes and Jolanda Jetten have assembled a 
cast of two dozen authors, in addition to themselves, to address what they call in their introductory chapter “the puz-
zle of individuality and the group.” Social identity theory has helped us appreciate the extent to which we see our-
selves as members of groups, but its proponents have increasingly recognized that it is in some important sense indi-
viduals who see themselves in that way.
Sen, Appiah, and the social psychologists all seem to suggest a conception of identity that encompasses individu-
ality and autonomy but they seem unaware of the extensive body of neo-Eriksonian research and theory in develop-
mental psychology that provides such a conception. Among developmentalists there have been important challenges 
to Eriksonian theory in recent years. Taking a broader perspective, however, I will conclude that developmental theo-
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ries of identity have just what is lacking in the standard conceptions of social identity that have dominated the social 
sciences and humanities, including social psychology. If the present books are typical, there appears to be increasing 
recognition of the problem, if not the solution.
1. The multidimensionality of identity
It is common, Amartya Sen points out, to respond to a tragic story like that of Kader Mia with a wish that Hindus 
and Muslims could learn to respect each other, or at least tolerate each other, rather than killing each other. Such a re-
sponse, however, implicitly accepts the fundamental assumption underlying the violence: that there are two types of 
people, Hindus and Muslims (along with other religions not relevant here). This fails to acknowledge that people are 
multidimensional and that any two people, therefore, are likely to be similar in some important ways and different in 
some important ways. Kader Mia and his killers differed in religion but were all Bengali. Had this identity been sa-
lient, there would have been no reason for murder.
In fact, within just a few years, the religious dichotomization did give way to a new nationalism. Now the peo-
ple of Dhaka were celebrating Bengali culture, including its language, literature, and music, united across religious 
lines in a Bengali patriotism aimed at resisting the political, linguistic, and economic hegemony of western Pakistan. 
Sen’s point is not that a Bengali identity is better than a Hindu or Muslim identity. The events leading to the division 
of Pakistan and the founding of Bangladesh were violent in their own right. His point is that we all have multiple 
identities, or at least multidimensional identities, such that we cannot be characterized accurately on the basis of one 
dimension. It is the pervasive misunderstanding of this empirical fact, he believes, that underlies most of the large-
scale political violence in the world.
2. The rational construction of identity
Unwarranted dichotomization of identity on the basis of a single dimension–you are and must be Hindu or Mus-
lim–creates what Sen calls the illusion of destiny. We think we are born into a particular group and are thus destined 
to have a singular identity defi ned by that group, but in fact we are born into and affi liate with multiple groups. Sim-
ilarly, in The ethics of identity, Kwame Anthony Appiah rejects the romantic notion of identity formation as a search 
for a pre-existing authentic self waiting to be found or discovered.
But Appiah equally rejects the existential conception of identity formation as the unconstrained invention of self. 
And Sen, similarly, sees identity as the product of reason and choice within constraints beyond our choosing. We are 
not free to be whomever we wish. There are always options, but there are always limits.
These views are fully consistent with the rational constructivism underlying the neo-Eriksonian paradigm in de-
velopmental psychology (Moshman, 2005). Identity, in this view, is constructed, not simply discovered, but the con-
struction is not a free creation. Rather the construction of identity is a creative act constrained, but not determined, 
by inner and outer realities, including our social affi liations and the perceptions of those around us. We cannot ignore 
our ongoing connections with others or the categories into which others classify us, but neither are our identities en-
tirely determined by such facts. Rather our identities are rationally constructed. Such construction occurs within so-
cial contexts and its outcomes refl ect such contexts. But without the constructive actions of a rational agent, no iden-
tities would be constructed. Thus identity entails individuality and autonomy. Social and personal identity cannot be 
sharply distinguished. Our identities are simultaneously social and personal.
3. Identity, culture, and diversity
Part of the problem in conceptualizing identity, argue both Sen and Appiah, is that we are immersed in loose talk 
about culture and diversity. Contrary to common assumptions, argues Sen, cultures intersect and interact in complex 
ways that undermine any effort to attribute particular identities to particular cultures. Moreover, as he illustrates in 
detail, this is nothing new: Communication and interchange across cultures have been the norm all over the world for 
millennia.
Similarly, Appiah questions common perceptions of the United States as a multicultural society. Clearly the United 
States does not consist of some fi nite number of discrete cultures. Even if we take a more subtle view of culture, the 
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U.S. is much less multicultural than it used to be and much less multicultural than many or most other countries. 
This is true for virtually any measure of cultural diversity. With respect to language, for example, the vast majority 
of Americans, including the children of Asian and Hispanic immigrants, speak fl uent English. The proportion of non-
English-speaking U.S. residents was four times greater in 1890 than it is today. Even more striking, in Appiah’s na-
tive Ghana, with a population about that of New York State, there are several dozen current languages, none of which 
is used by a majority. The American preoccupation with diversity, he suggests, refl ects a need, in a relatively homo-
geneous culture, to fi nd more specifi c bases for identity.
It thus makes little sense to speak of identity as if each person grows up in a particular culture and comes to have 
an identity determined largely by that culture. To make matters worse, not only do we succumb to the illusion that the 
human world can be divided into some fi nite number of cultures, it is fashionable to reduce the number of such cul-
tures to two: “Western” culture, rooted in the cultures of Europe, and “non-Western” or “Eastern” culture, encom-
passing everything else. Western culture is typically associated with individuality and autonomy; Eastern culture is 
associated with social identities in which group affi liation is intrinsic to the self.
Both Sen and Appiah decry simplistic reductions of this sort. Individuality, autonomy, and social interconnection 
are all aspects of the universal human condition, regardless of culture. Identity formation, moreover, is not a process 
driven by culture toward a predictable destination. To attribute identity to culture is to succumb to the illusion of des-
tiny. We grow into a multiplicity of affi liations from the time we are born and we later make rational choices among 
multiple options in constructing our identities.
4. Reconsidering social identity
Meanwhile in the fi eld of social psychology, proponents of social identity theory have reached similar conclu-
sions. Individuality and collectivity, note the editors in their introduction to Individuality and the group, have tradi-
tionally been seen as inconsistent, or at least in tension, with each other. The concept of social identity potentially un-
dermines the individual vs. group dichotomy in that social identities simultaneously defi ne individuals and connect 
them with groups. Social identity theory, however, has tended to highlight group phenomena at the expense of in-
dividuality. This is understandable in that social identity theory was originally developed in reaction to a perceived 
overemphasis on individuals and with the primary intent of illuminating intergroup relations. Unfortunately, social 
identity theory—and especially its close cousin, self-categorization theory—have tended toward deterministic views 
of group infl uence that underplay individual autonomy. The editors believe, however, that conceptions of social iden-
tity have increasingly recognized individuality and autonomy, and have organized the present volume to illustrate re-
cent advances along these lines in social identity research and theory.
The individual chapters are diverse both in topic and perspective. In a concluding synthesis, the editors helpfully 
identify fi ve key themes. First, personal identity, an individual’s unique sense of self, is both constrained and in-
formed by social identity in multiple ways. Second, researchers must address the subjective experience of individu-
ality and autonomy, as well as the need for feelings of connection. Third, groups may value, rather than punish, indi-
vidual autonomy when it is perceived as for the good of the group. Fourth, the relation between personal and social 
identity is one of reciprocal interaction in which neither can be considered primary. Finally, groups are dynamic, 
and it is precisely in the evolution of social identities that we see the role of individuality and autonomy in group 
processes.
Despite the recognition and status of personal identity among social identity theorists, however, it continues to be 
seen as distinct from, albeit interacting with, social identity. But identity is about oneness. Without seeking to deny 
the importance of either the individual or the social, what are we to make of this personal/social duality?
5. What the world needs now is Erik Erikson
Within developmental psychology, there is a rich tradition of theory and research on identity that derives its impe-
tus from the developmental theorizing of Erik Erikson and the theoretical and methodological refi nements of James 
Marcia (Kroger, 2007 and Moshman, 2005). This work focuses on what has traditionally been called ego identity, re-
fl ecting the psychoanalytic roots of Erikson’s theorizing, and is now often called personal identity. The developmen-
tal approach has always incorporated the conception that our identities are deeply rooted in our social roles and con-
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nections with others. Our conceptions of ourselves as persons cannot help but be, in part, conceptions of our relations 
with other persons and of our affi liations with various social groups. Thus social identity is intrinsic to identity rather 
than distinct from a more “personal” form of identity.
Unfortunately, the identity literatures of social and developmental psychology are remarkably insulated from each 
other. Only one chapter of the Postmes/Jetten volume cites Erikson or Marcia and that one cites both together in a 
single passing reference. Not a single chapter cites Archer, Berzonsky, Chandler, Côté, Grotevant, Kroger, Phin-
ney, or Waterman, all mainstays of the Eriksonian identity literature. Another recent edited volume on social identity 
(Ashmore, Jussim, & Wilder, 2001), chosen only because it was readily available, gives equally short shrift to the de-
velopmental literature. Correspondingly, two recent reviews of the neo-Eriksonian identity literature (Kroger, 2007 
and Moshman, 2005) each cite all of the Eriksonian developmentalists named above but neither cites the social iden-
tity literature.
The two psychological literatures of identity–social and developmental–are not slighted only by each other, more-
over. Neither of these psychological literatures gets more than passing mention in Identity and violence or The ethics 
of identity, or in other recent works on identity (Gutmann, 2003 and Maalouf, 2001). Clearly the identity literatures 
of the behavioral and social sciences and humanities could profi t from awareness of each other and greater interac-
tion of ideas. And in this broader realm, without denying that developmental psychology has much to learn, it already 
has much to offer. Theorists in diverse disciplines and fi elds of study are looking for what developmentalists take for 
granted: an Eriksonian conception of identity that encompasses social identity without losing itself in social or cul-
tural determinism.
The developmental tradition, in turn, can learn from the social identity tradition in social psychology and fi elds be-
yond psychology that identity is not just a glorious developmental achievement but also a serious danger—a source 
of division, suspicion, antagonism, and violence (in addition to Sen’s Identity and violence, see Ashmore et al., 2001, 
Dovidio et al., 2005, Maalouf, 2001 and Moshman, in press). An integrated understanding of identity may enable the 
construction of more cosmopolitan identities as recommended in the fi nal chapter of Appiah’s Ethics of identity (for 
elaboration, see Appiah, 2006). But at the very least it may help us recognize that we have choices, and that dichoto-
mization is not destiny.
Would any of this have helped Kader Mia? When all those around you categorize you in a particular way, your 
options are limited. When our options are less constricted, however, and especially when we enjoy the luxury of re-
fl ective theorizing, we should resist the forces and fallacies of dichotomization by insisting on the multidimensional 
complexity of identity and the role of individuality and autonomy. On that point, all the social theorists represented 
in these books seem to agree not only with each other but also, without realizing it, with developmental research and 
theory. 
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